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 3 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 30, 2002, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, commonly known throughout the 
world as SOX, and was passed into law with President Bush’s signature after an 
overwhelming majority of Congress voted in favor of the Act.  Sarbanes-Oxley shocked 
both the U.S. and international accounting communities upon its passage.  The primary 
goal of this law is to protect U.S. investors from future accounting scandals.  In the wake 
of the accounting scandals that rocked U.S. capital markets in the early part of the 
century, it is “no surprise the issue of corporate governance in the beginning of 2002 
became top of the U.S. political agenda.”1 
What is surprising, however, is the significant impact this sweeping piece of 
legislation has had on countries throughout the world.  With over 1300 foreign companies 
currently listed on U.S. markets, SOX is inherently an all-encompassing international 
affair that has affected the world tremendously since its creation.2  In addition to 
domestic entities, Sarbanes-Oxley impacts foreign companies who are listed on U.S. 
exchanges and those foreign accounting firms who provide services to any U.S.-listed 
company.3  The scope of the Act on entities abroad inevitably raises the question of 
extraterritoriality.  The extraterritorial application of SOX has hindered the United States’ 
foreign relations with numerous countries throughout the world, resulting in the 
emergence of political, legal, and economic repercussions. 
                                                
1 Becker, Tim and Clarke, Peter. "Is Washington Now the Omnipotent Regulator of the European Financial 
System?" Ethical Corporation: Not an Oxymoron. http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=233 
(accessed April/20, 2008).  
2 "NOTE: International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002." 2004 Boston 
College International & Comparative Law Review Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review (Spring, 2004).  
3 The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-U.S. Accounting Firms. Journal of International Business 
Research, January, 2005. 1.  
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Sarbanes-Oxley’s convoluted language and complicated requirements have left 
domestic and foreign parties to struggle with the implementation of this legislation.  
Auditors, lawyers, politicians and executives have all partaken in the laborious plight to 
incorporate SOX into their professional practices.4  Tim Becker and Peter Clarke 
summarize the challenge foreign companies face with SOX by stating, “Simply put, a 
British or French company with a secondary listing on the New York Stock Exchange 
must comply with all provisions of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, unless there is an available 
exemption […].”5  With a minimal number of SOX exemptions granted thus far, the idea 
that this law will require entities throughout the world that participate in U.S. markets to 
comply with the rules and regulations set forth by SOX regardless of nationality has not 
produced a favorable reaction.  Consequently, this negative perception of SOX has 
resulted in increased efforts internationally to restructure the public accounting profession 
as an alternative to enduring the U.S. reforms.6 
Protecting investors worldwide and improving public company audits is a 
righteous objective and SOX will undoubtedly assist regulators in achieving this 
objective.  However, as many critics of the law argue, that is not to say that Sarbanes-
Oxley is the optimal solution, especially for international entities.7  With varying legal, 
institutional, and cultural systems throughout the world, it is imperative to resort to 
diplomacy and dialogue when a far-reaching piece of legislation such as SOX is created.  
                                                
4 Better Governance and Reporting Under Sarbanes - Oxley : Are we there Yet? Mondaq Business 
Briefing, November 23, 2004.  
5 Becker, Tim and Clarke, Peter. "Is Washington Now the Omnipotent Regulator of the European Financial 
System?" Ethical Corporation: Not an Oxymoron. http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=233 
(accessed April/20, 2008). 
6 The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-U.S. Accounting Firms. Journal of International Business 
Research, January, 2005. 1.  
7 Ibid. 
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Becker and Clarke state, “In today’s global economy, the need for international 
consultation is essential, even if the argument that the U.S. has every right to regulate its 
own securities markets is a compelling one.”8   
The United States’ decision to pass Sarbanes-Oxley into law without a more 
careful and thorough consideration of its international implications has created a strong 
negative reaction that, over five years later, has still not been resolved.  This is a major 
problem that the U.S. must address or else it will continue to receive backlash from the 
international community.  By requiring foreign entity compliance with SOX regulations, 
the U.S. is threatening the sovereignty of foreign nations and tarnishing its image abroad.  
If the U.S. does not develop an alternative arrangement for foreigners with respect to 
Sarbanes-Oxley, the U.S. will further isolate itself, suffering politically, economically, 
and socially. 
The intent of this study is to describe in detail the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley from 
economic, legal and political perspectives and the subsequent implications for U.S. 
foreign relations.  The purpose of this study is not to provide the ultimate solution to 
safeguard U.S. investors from corporate misconduct.  Rather, this paper identifies the 
context of the problems that emerged as a result of the impulsive legislation and evaluates 
alternative solutions to the original Act.  PART I of the study examines the PCAOB 
registration process and interprets Sections 102 and 106 of the Act, which address 
domestic and foreign registration, respectively.  This section also describes the impact of 
Sarbanes-Oxley on the public accounting profession and the challenges that arise from 
SOX compliance and PCAOB inspection.  PART II of the study focuses on the history of 
                                                
8 Becker, Tim and Clarke, Peter. "Is Washington Now the Omnipotent Regulator of the European Financial 
System?" Ethical Corporation: Not an Oxymoron. http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=233 
(accessed April/20, 2008). 
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U.S. securities legislation and its traditional stance with respect to foreign entities.  This 
section then explores the international challenges of SOX and contrasts it with previously 
established U.S. securities laws.  PART III surveys the economic, legal, and political 
impact of the Act and the subsequent implications for U.S. foreign relations. PART IV of 
the study examines the demand for alternative solutions to Sarbanes-Oxley and evaluates 
two different alternatives that have been discussed as viable options to the Act in recent 
years.  Finally, the study concludes with an assessment of the development of SOX and 
the PCAOB since 2002. 
 
PART I 
PCAOB Registration: 
 Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act established the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, commonly referred to as the PCAOB.9  The principal role of the 
PCAOB is to protect U.S. investors, primarily through oversight of public accountants 
charged with the role of auditing U.S. public companies.  The Board oversees the conduct 
of all registered firms.  Under SOX, all public accounting firms who participate in the 
financial statement audits of publicly listed companies in the United States must register 
with the PCAOB.  One source notes, “Registration is a key to the PCAOB’s powers in 
that registration with the PCAOB opens registering firms to inspections and sanctions by 
the PCAOB.”10  Registration essentially provides the PCAOB complete authority under 
SOX over those firms registered, U.S. and foreign firms alike.  Its authority, in addition 
                                                
9 One Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of America. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Translated 
by U.S. Congress. Vol. H.R. 3763--21Federal, 2002,  
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/sarbanesoxley072302.pdf (accessed November 30, 2007).  
10 The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-U.S. Accounting Firms. Journal of International Business 
Research, January, 2005. 1. 
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to developing standardized audit practices that firms must follow, includes the ability to 
assign penalties to any registered firm found to be in violation of Sarbanes-Oxley or any 
section of it.11 
 It has been said that the idea behind requiring firms to register with the Board is to 
attain greater control over the public accounting profession and to better monitor its 
activities, thus avoiding future auditing deficiencies.12  Currently there are 1848 public 
accounting firms registered with the PCAOB.13  This sizeable number of registrants 
clearly demonstrates the power of the Board over the global public accounting 
profession.  In order to determine whether the Board’s objectives as established by SOX 
have been achieved, it is necessary to analyze the sections of the Act that establish the 
framework for PCAOB registration.  Section 102 of the Act focuses on domestic 
registration requirements while section 106 specifically addresses the registration of 
foreign accounting entities. 
Section 102 
 The first paragraph under section 102 discusses the mandatory registration 
required of U.S. public accounting firms.  The legislation states, “It shall be unlawful for 
any person that is not a registered public accounting firm to prepare or issue, or to 
participate in the preparation or issuance of, any audit report with respect to any issuer.”14  
Therefore, any accounting firm that actively participated in preparing a U.S. listed 
                                                
11 Ibid. 
12 PCAOB-Beyond the First Year. Mondaq Business Briefing, July 15, 2004.  
13 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. PCAOB 2008-2013 Strategic Plan 2008, 
www.pcaobus.org (accessed May 2, 2008). 
14 One Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of America. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
Translated by U.S. Congress. Vol. H.R. 3763--21Federal, 2002,  
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/sarbanesoxley072302.pdf (accessed November 30, 2007).  
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company’s audit report can no longer continue to do so by law without registering with 
the PCAOB.   
The subsequent paragraph explains the process of registering with the Board and 
provides a detailed description of the information necessary to completing the application 
for registration.  The content of the application must include a list of the prior year public 
companies audited by the firm, a list of the companies the firm believes it will audit in the 
current year, a fees disclosure, and any other financial information deemed necessary and 
thereby requested by the Board.15  Additionally, the firm must disclose its financial 
statement audit control processes, provide a record of its employed accountants including 
their licensing information, divulge information about pending disciplinary proceedings 
concerning possible audit report deficiencies, if any, and also provide copies of 
disclosures pertaining to accounting disagreements between the firm and its clients.16  
Finally, the legislation creates a “catch-all” clause for registration, requiring firms to 
release “such other information as the rules of the Board or the [Securities and Exchange] 
Commission shall specify as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors.”17  This final clause ultimately gives the Board total discretion 
over the information it can instruct firms to provide in order to register with the PCAOB.  
Finally, it is required that firms comprehend and consent to the rules of registration 
established by the Board as well as the implications of SOX regarding continued 
compliance in the future.18 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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 The final three paragraphs of section 102 are vital to fully understand the impact 
Sarbanes-Oxley has on registered firms and their business practices.  Paragraph (d) of the 
section describes the mandatory annual report registered firms must issue each year and 
update as necessary per the Board’s request.19  This will increase the workload of public 
accounting firms by a significant amount each year as well as the costs of SOX 
compliance.  Paragraph (e) reveals that information provided to the Board by registered 
firms will be made available to the public unless the Board deems part of it to be 
sensitive in nature to the firm.20  If, on a case-by-case basis, the Board deems particular 
information to be sensitive to a firm, this select information will be shielded from public 
release.  This introduces the issue of intellectual property and confidentiality laws, raising 
speculation from critics that SOX possibly is in violations of these statutes.  The final part 
of this section, paragraph (f), introduces the fees provision, which requires that firms pay 
both an initial registration fee and subsequent fees each year thereafter to the Board.21  
This will undoubtedly provide an additional financial burden to accounting firms and it is 
interesting to note that the Board has the discretion to determine the appropriate fee 
amount firms will need to pay.  Per the Board’s 2008 Budget approved by the SEC and 
released late in 2007, the 2008 accounting support fee is an estimated $134.5 million (See 
attached budget).22  This amount is funded both by public companies listed in the U.S. 
and PCAOB registered accounting firms in a manner outlined in detail in Section 109 of 
the Act. 
 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. 2008 Budget by Area, December 2007 www.pcaobus.org 
(accessed May 2, 2008). 
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Section 106 
 Section 106 is vital to the understanding of Title I of Sarbanes-Oxley because it 
describes the influence this piece of U.S. legislation will have on foreign accounting 
firms and the international community in general.  As one source notes, “With the global 
economy and the international structure of audit clients, it is inevitable that accounting 
firms will need to rely on foreign accounting firms and other entities in order to complete 
certain [parts] of their audit reports.”23  Consequently, it is no surprise that SOX 
specifically addresses the treatment of foreign accounting firms and the role that they 
play in completing the audits of U.S. public companies.  What is surprising, however, is 
the lack of distinction between what is required of domestic firms under the Act and what 
is now required of foreign firms. 
 The first paragraph of section 106 defines the applicability of Sarbanes-Oxley to 
foreign public accounting firms.  The legislation reads: 
Any foreign public accounting firm that prepares or furnishes an audit report with 
respect to any issuer, shall be subject to this Act and the rules of the Board and the 
Commission issued under this Act, in the same manner and to the same extent as a 
public accounting firm that is organized and operates under the laws of the United 
States, or any state, except that registration pursuant to section 102 shall not by 
itself provide a basis for subjecting such a foreign public accounting firm to the 
jurisdiction of the Federal or State courts, other than with respect to controversies 
between such firms and the Board.24 
                                                
23 PCAOB-Beyond the First Year. Mondaq Business Briefing, July 15, 2004. 
24 One Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of America. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
Translated by U.S. Congress. Vol. H.R. 3763--21Federal, 2002,  
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/sarbanesoxley072302.pdf (accessed November 30, 2007).  
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In other words, those foreign entities involved in the audits of companies listed on U.S. 
securities exchanges have to register with the PCAOB and will, in theory, avoid reporting 
to the U.S. courts system provided that they are in full compliance with the tenets of 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  This paragraph also clarifies the authority of the Board over these 
foreign firms.  The legislation essentially mandates that it is necessary for the foreign 
firms to register with the PCAOB in the interest of investor protection even if they do not 
directly issue the audit report for a public company but play a significant role in the audit 
process.25  This “associated entity” clause not only affects foreign firms who now must 
register even though they are not issuing the audit report, but it also significantly 
influences domestic accounting firms.26  Accordingly, domestic firms that base some of 
their opinion on supplemental work conducted by foreign firms during the course of the 
audit are prohibited from relying on it unless the firms are officially registered with the 
PCAOB.27 
 The following paragraph discusses the role of both foreign and domestic firms in 
the production of foreign audit workpapers to the Board.  This section of the Act 
stipulates that, by registering, foreign firms are assumed to have consented to the 
production of their workpapers to the Board if requested to do so.28  Additionally, foreign 
firm registration assumes having consented “to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts 
of the United States for purposes of enforcement of any request for production of such 
                                                                                                                                            
 
25 Ibid. 
26 PCAOB-Beyond the First Year. Mondaq Business Briefing, July 15, 2004. 
27 Ibid. 
28 One Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of America. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
Translated by U.S. Congress. Vol. H.R. 3763--21Federal, 2002,  
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/sarbanesoxley072302.pdf (accessed November 30, 2007).  
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workpapers.”29  On the other hand, those domestic firms registered with the Board have 
also provided implied consent to the PCAOB.  In this case, domestic firms working with 
foreign counterparts during the course of an audit have assumed the responsibility to help 
the Board obtain necessary foreign workpapers.  Domestic firms are also responsible for 
securing a commitment from their foreign counterparts to cooperate with the PCAOB 
when necessary.30 
 The final two paragraphs of section 106 provide clarity pertaining to the Board’s 
intended treatment of foreign accounting firms and the firms to which it foresees SOX as 
being applicable to.  Paragraph (c) describes the power that the PCAOB has to grant 
exemptions to foreign firms.31  Basically, this clause grants the PCAOB the power to 
exempt foreign firms from complying with certain parts of the Act provided that 
investors’ interests remain protected.  Additionally, paragraph (d) attempts to clarify the 
meaning of foreign accounting firm to distinguish from that of a domestic accounting 
firm.  SOX reads, “In this section, the term ‘foreign public accounting firm’ means a 
public accounting firm that is organized and operates under the laws of a foreign 
government or political subdivision thereof.”32  It is interesting to note that the 
concluding paragraph of a section devoted to emphasizing the similar treatment of 
foreign and domestic firms under SOX stresses a distinction between foreign and 
domestic firms that essentially lacks little meaning to the application of this law in 
practice. 
 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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Application of Sections 102 & 106 
 Upon the acceptance of Sarbanes-Oxley into United States law, both the domestic 
and international communities began to recognize the far-reaching effect this law has.  
The former European Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services, Fritz 
Bolkestein, was quoted as saying, “Section 106 requires all big EU audit firms to register 
with the proposed Board, pay registration fees, apply US rules on auditing, ethics, and 
quality control, and subject themselves to the investigative and disciplinary sanctions of 
the Board and US authorities.”33  He also expressed uneasiness about requiring European 
Union accounting firms to simultaneously abide by both EU and U.S. securities laws.  
This concern can certainly be extrapolated to other nations and the difficulties they will 
face conforming to both the U.S. and their domestic regulatory systems. 
 An illustrative example clarifies the implication of section 106 and will convey 
further meaning to the demand of SOX on foreign firms.  Consider if U.S. Firm X audits 
a large, multinational company that holds a foreign subsidiary in the European Union and 
is registered on a U.S. stock exchange.  Firm Y, operating under the laws of the EU, 
assists Firm X in its audit of the company by performing the testing of the foreign 
subsidiary’s internal controls.  Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Firm Y must register with 
the PCAOB if any of its audit work is to be relied upon for the purpose of Firm X’s audit 
of the U.S. listed corporation.   
 Consequently, Firm Y, during the course of its registration with the PCAOB and 
future compliance with SOX, may find itself in the unfavorable position of complying 
with two legal systems simultaneously.  Furthermore, Firm Y may find that it cannot 
                                                
33 Eu Warns on Sarbanes - Oxley Act. Financial News (Daily), September 6, 2002.  
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comply with both countries’ laws at the same time due to their inherently conflicting 
nature.  In the latter case, does Firm Y choose to follow the laws of the country it 
operates within or the laws of a foreign country?  One source interestingly declares, 
“Through its ability to register all firms that audit public companies, including foreign 
auditors, […] the PCAOB will be able to regulate both national and foreign audit firms 
involved in the U.S. securities market.”34  It is this power, among many others, possessed 
by the PCAOB that has led foreign firms to protest Sarbanes-Oxley and question its 
effectiveness in relation to international auditors. 
Sarbanes-Oxley & the Accounting Profession 
 Before the PCAOB emerged in the United States under Sarbanes-Oxley, the 
accounting profession was responsible for the both its own regulation and funding of this 
regulation.35  The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is the 
national association for U.S. public accountants.  Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, the AICPA 
issued and enforced a code of conduct by which accountants upheld.  After the PCAOB 
was founded, oversight of public accountants in the U.S. became separated by law from 
the accounting profession.  Regulation of the fields of accounting and law in the past has 
differed greatly from the regulation of other industries and professions.  In the aftermath 
of the accounting scandals, however, it became apparent to lawmakers that drastic change 
was needed.36  One source summarizes this change by saying, “Consequently, by 
implementing provisions such as board audit committees, auditor service restrictions, and 
                                                
34 Giles, Jill P., Elizabeth K. Venuti, and Richard C. Jones. "The PCAOB and Convergence of the Global 
Auditing and Accounting Profession." The CPA Journal 74, no. 9 (Sep, 2004): 36.  
35"NOTE: International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002." 2004 Boston 
College International & Comparative Law Review Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review (Spring, 2004).  
36 Ibid. 
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attorney conduct standards, SOX bridged the long standing divide between federal 
securities regulation, state corporate governance law, and professional self-regulation.”37 
Effectively, Sarbanes-Oxley in one swift swoop turned the former self-regulating 
accounting profession upside down and transformed it into a rule-centered profession that 
operates under the constant supervision of the PCAOB.  The accounting industry’s 
dissatisfaction with this change is rather apparent given the PCAOB’s nickname, 
“Peekaboo,” referring to its constant monitoring of the industry’s actions.   The CPA 
Journal conducted a survey of auditing professionals about Sarbanes-Oxley and the role 
of the PCAOB after a few years had passed since the Act’s creation.  This source reports 
one respondent as saying: “I think that there is an expectations gap here.  Even if we get 
financial reporting 99.9% accurate, that 0.1% will still generate enough headlines and bad 
press to keep accounting problems in the news.  So then, how effective is SOX in reality 
to the profession?”38  While the future of the newly created Board is not certain, it is 
widely recognized that the PCAOB plays a significant role in the accounting industry 
worldwide, regardless of its acceptance among professionals.39 
Apart from the regulation of public accountants, the overall impact on the 
accounting industry and its practices is far-reaching.  While the purpose of this study is 
not to perform an in-depth analysis of Sarbanes-Oxley in its entirety, it is necessary to 
identify the significant areas of the law that impact both U.S. and foreign accounting 
practices.  The five primary areas in which SOX changes prior practices are: (1) The 
relationship between audit committees and their external auditors; (2) Auditor 
                                                
37 Ibid. 
38 PCAOB-Beyond the First Year. Mondaq Business Briefing, July 15, 2004. 
39 Hill, Nancy T., John E. McEnroe, and Kevin T. Stevens. "Auditors' Reactions to Sarbanes-Oxley." The 
CPA Journal 77, no. 7 (Jul, 2007): 6.  
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independence and services allowed; (3) Mandatory auditor internal control assessment; 
(4) Management internal control assessment; and (5) Document retention.40  
Additionally, another source notes the added disclosures now required of firms and the 
threat of criminal punishment have also drastically affected the industry.41  These new 
practices have been difficult and costly for U.S. firms to implement into their operations.   
Furthermore, the differences that existed between the U.S. and foreign accounting 
industries have made it all the more difficult for those foreign companies and firms under 
the reach of SOX to implement these practices.  For example, David Sun, a partner-in-
charge of assurance and advisory for Ernst and Young Asia-Pacific commented on the 
difficulty of complying with auditor rotation requirements, a tenet designed to ensure 
auditor independence.  International Securities Outlook Online states, “Sun said that the 
SEC’s proposals would not work in many Asian countries without affecting audit quality.  
Asian countries are unable to train accountants fast enough to keep pace with their 
economic development.”42  Because the stage of development of the accounting 
profession varies from region to region, it proves difficult to implement the auditor 
rotation requirement mandated by SOX.  For instance, the ratios of auditors to people in 
the United States and China are 1:1,000 and 1:13,000, respectively.43  This enormous 
                                                
40 The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-U.S. Accounting Firms. Journal of International Business 
Research, January, 2005. 1.  
41 "NOTE: International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002." 2004 Boston 
College International & Comparative Law Review Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review (Spring, 2004).  
42 "Foreign Securities Regulators Express Concern about Auditor Independence Rules." International 
Securities Outlook Online Volume 4, Issue 1 (January 6, 2003, 2003): December 1, 2007, 
http://business.cch.com. 
43 "NOTE: International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002." 2004 Boston 
College International & Comparative Law Review Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review (Spring, 2004). 
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difference demonstrates the general rigidity of SOX and the difficulty of putting its 
decrees into practice outside of the U.S. 
Additionally, the intrinsic disparities that exist between the U.S. rule-centered 
accounting system and the European principles-based system lead many abroad to reject 
the imposition of SOX.  In fact, many Europeans are of the mindset that the rule-based 
system is largely responsible for allowing the occurrence of the accounting scandals in 
the first place.44  There have been many requests submitted to the SEC, primarily from 
Europe, asking for regulators around the world to develop a universal principles 
accounting system.45  This would allow for a coherent worldwide system to develop in 
place of a system where accountants must reconcile to a number of different regulatory 
systems.  Former SEC commissioner, Roel Campos, has made it clear, according to one 
source, that the SEC does not intend “to hold foreign participants in the U.S. market to a 
higher level of regulation or review than the level to which we hold U.S.-based 
participants.”46  While this may in fact be the case, adherence to multiple regulatory 
environments is a reality for foreign entities.  This reality has only been worsened by 
Sarbanes-Oxley and foreign market participants are certainly feeling the effects of it. 
Compliance & Inspection 
  Apart from considerable registration and annual membership fees, the costs of 
putting Sarbanes-Oxley into practice is substantial for both U.S. listed companies and the 
accounting firms auditing them.  These heightened costs create an obvious disadvantage 
                                                
44 Sarbanes - Oxley Debate: Will Pitt Offer Compromise for Non-US Firms? The Accountant, October 21, 
2002. 3.  
45 "Foreign Securities Regulators Express Concern about Auditor Independence Rules." International 
Securities Outlook Online Volume 4, Issue 1 (January 6, 2003, 2003): December 1, 2007, 
http://business.cch.com. 
46 Text: Rules Changes Will Bolster Confidence, SEC Commissioner Says; Changes Treat Foreign and 
Domestic Companies Equally, Campos Adds. State Department, June 12, 2003.  
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for smaller firms with limited resources as well as foreign firms, who now face the costs 
of multiple regulatory bodies.47  Additionally, not all of the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley with 
respect to foreign firms are monetary.  The ramifications of subjecting foreign firms to 
produce its workpapers or undergo U.S. inspection are by no means purely fiscal.  Rather, 
these requirements put foreign firms in the unfavorable position of potentially violating 
their home country laws in order to comply with SOX.   
Where information that is considered confidential under one nation’s law is now 
required to be produced under U.S. law, conflict of law is imminent and the cost to 
foreign firms is detrimental.48  Ethiopis Tafara, Director of the Office of International 
Affairs for the SEC, explained the position of the Commission during a speech in 
London.  On the production of workpapers and conflict of laws, he states, “Non-
production of the papers and delays can significantly impede an enforcement program.  
While [the SEC] certainly respect[s] foreign laws, national boundaries cannot serve to 
shield foreign participants in the US market from investigation.”49  Paragraph (c) of 
Section 106 grants power to the PCAOB to grant exemptions to foreign governments 
when appropriate.  Many foreign opponents to the Act have called upon the Board for 
workpaper exemption among others, but the Board has not granted this request to date in 
the interest of investors.50  Debate over U.S. enforcement of SOX abroad and the 
different business and legal structures across the world has been a hot topic.  The PCAOB 
                                                
47 The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-U.S. Accounting Firms. Journal of International Business 
Research, January, 2005. 1.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Tafara, Ethiopis. "Speech by SEC Staff: U.S. Perspective on Accountancy Regulation and Reforms by 
Ethiopis Tafara." London, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, July 8, 2003, 2003, 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch070803et.htm (accessed December, 1 2007). 
50 Miller, Richard I. and Paul H. Pashkoff. "Regulations Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act." Journal of 
Accountancy 194, no. 4 (Oct, 2002): 33.  
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will need to find a solution for foreign registrants and address how it intends to conduct 
its regulatory activities outside U.S. borders.51 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the PCAOB holds the power to inspect registrants and 
their auditing procedures regardless of nationality.  If a firm is found in violation of a 
SOX tenet, the Board can issue a number of sanctions.  The ultimate sanction the 
PCAOB can utilize involves revoking a firm’s registration status, thereby preventing that 
firm from auditing public companies listed on U.S. capital markets.52  One source states 
that the “PCAOB’s inspections of registered audit firms are intended to assess the degree 
of audit firms’ compliance with audit standards in conducting audits.  These inspections 
may be very thorough, and could entail discussions with audit clients and restatements in 
the event accounting errors are discovered.”53  In addition to existing SEC regulations 
already followed by foreign companies, SOX now introduces a regular schedule of 
inspection for compliance purposes as well as inspections when firm conduct is in 
question.54 
In lieu of a PCAOB inspection, foreign accounting firms may have the option of 
having a domestic regulatory body conduct the inspection.  However, the decision of the 
PCAOB to rely on the foreign regulatory body’s inspection results will heavily weigh on 
the integrity of the system as perceived by the Board.55  The PCAOB has been 
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collaborating with foreign regulators to explore the possibility of conducting joint 
inspections to improve cost and efficiency of SOX compliance across borders, but the 
outcome of these efforts have yet to be determined.56  Finally, if the Board does in fact 
accept the inspection of foreign firms by foreign regulatory bodies, the question still 
remains as to the treatment of those firms found in violation of SOX practices.  As one 
source notes, “Although imprisonment and fines are penalties integrated into the Act, it 
remains to be seen how, and for what provisions, the SEC will apply these sanctions to 
foreign violators.”57  Even if the PCAOB is able to develop a compatible system of 
inspection abroad, it still has not addressed the manner in which it intends to enforce 
SOX for accounting firms operating within foreign borders found to be in violation of the 
U.S. law. 
 
PART II 
History of U.S. Securities Law 
 Sarbanes-Oxley has been said to be the most significant piece of securities reform 
legislation since the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, which were created to prevent 
another stock market crash like that of 1929.  In order to see why Sarbanes-Oxley has 
received such negative reaction internationally, one must first understand the basics of 
U.S. securities law and how it has previously been applied to international entities.  Prior 
to SOX, the SEC and U.S. courts in conjunction established a framework that achieved 
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foreign compliance with U.S. regulations while still honoring the laws of their domestic 
governments.58  SOX does not destroy this loose framework, but it does threaten to tip 
the historical balance by not respecting the laws and institutions, mainly those involving 
accounting oversight, of countries abroad. 
 Regulation S was the SEC’s first significant step to address foreign concerns 
about SEC foreign registration requirements for securities transactions under the 
Securities Act of 1933.59  The SEC’s issuance of Regulations S provided additional 
information to foreign companies with respect to registering for U.S. capital market 
access while ensuring that the autonomy of their domestic governments was still 
honored.60  The purpose of the SEC is to protect U.S. investors from fraudulent business 
actions, thereby providing a secure capital market environment in the United States.  As a 
result, protecting investors from fraud is often said to be the defining characteristic of 
U.S. securities law, which consequently affects investors from all over the globe.61 
 To determine whether fraudulent behavior has occurred and also whether the 
United States has jurisdiction of the matter in question, the U.S. courts have developed 
two tests for their decision-making process: Effects and Conduct.62  The application of 
these tests historically has determined whether the U.S. should pursue extraterritorial 
enforcement of its securities laws.  The idea behind the tests is to essentially limit U.S. 
pursuit of claims regarding securities law violations outside its sovereign borders.63  This 
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format provides a cohesive manner in which courts determine whether subject matter 
jurisdiction applies outside of U.S. borders.  In addition, the tests limit the amount that 
the U.S. can impose its laws and subsequent penalties on foreign citizens and 
corporations.64 
 The SEC threw away its traditional accommodations for foreign issuers with 
respect to securities legislation when SOX was issued.  Although the SEC has granted 
some degree of exemption to foreign firms from Sarbanes-Oxley, the international feeling 
toward the law is still unfavorable and many are confused by the United States’ 
divergence from its historical method of regulation for international entities.  One source 
believes that “much of this confusion is attributable to a widening gap between the 
original premise of the U.S. securities laws in relation to foreign issues and the new 
reality of globalization.”65  Although in the past there have been instances in which the 
SEC has taken action against foreign issuers, especially with respect to anti-fraud 
legislation, non-U.S. companies take these limited occurrences into account when 
deciding whether or not to list on U.S. exchanges.66  Historically, the risk of answering to 
the U.S. Courts for securities law violation has not deterred the entrance of foreign firms 
into the market.  However, one must wonder if Sarbanes-Oxley and its heightened risk of 
U.S. enforcement abroad will now push foreign companies away from the U.S. capital 
market. 
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International Challenges of Sarbanes-Oxley 
 The international outrage toward Sarbanes-Oxley is best summarized by the 
following statement: “SOX reaches beyond the registration and disclosure requirements 
first established by the 1933 and 1934 Acts and forces foreign corporations to conform to 
a model of corporate governance crafted by the U.S. Congress.”67  Those who object to 
the Act are wary of the increasing reach of the SEC and newly created PCAOB.  
International concern primarily stems from Section 106 and there is a call to allow 
foreign exemptions for those firms that are cross-listed on U.S. exchanges.68  Many 
critics emphasize that they believe in the overall purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley, but do not 
support the tedious requirements now demanded of foreign corporations. 
 Another common reaction to SOX is that many believe it was created to clean up 
the mess of scandals that occurred in the U.S. during 2002 and that foreign firms should 
not have to suffer the consequences of cleaning up the U.S. system.  One source believes 
that “extending this regulation beyond US firms is seen as an arrogant imposition from 
American regulators.”69  The negative foreign opinion stems from the fact that U.S. firms 
gain the upper hand over international accounting firms who now must answer to 
multiple regulatory systems.  Disapproval of SOX is especially prevalent in the European 
Union, where governments are currently trying to merge several economies, all with 
differing laws and regulatory bodies, into a single, unified EU economic system.70  
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Sarbanes-Oxley essentially deepens this burden for the EU and the U.S. could possibly 
face future repercussions from the EU if it were to unify.   
Answering to more than one accounting regulation system is an extreme 
disadvantage for foreign firms and representatives of the Big Four Accounting firms 
abroad have readily voiced their dissatisfaction with the new law.  Aidan Walsh, an 
executive of KPMG International, has said that SOX has made it tricky for the firm to 
implement abroad and believes that “the Act was put together hastily and with little 
regard for the consequences to companies based outside of the US.”71  A European 
partner at PriceWaterhouseCoopers echoes a similar attitude toward SOX and explains 
international opposition by stating, “No one wants to be a copy of the US.  If there is any 
country where something has gone wrong in the field of corporate governance, and 
accounting and capital markets, it’s the US.”72  Consequently, the international 
community is now beginning to wonder if the U.S. capital market is really the place to 
invest if companies are now forced to comply with a law that puts them at an inherent 
disadvantage in the marketplace.73 
In some ways, it is surprising that there is such opposition abroad because foreign 
corporations have traditionally followed U.S. securities laws for years in the past.  A 
careful look into the legal framework of securities regulation provides valuable insight 
into this apparent anomaly.  Although the creation of Regulation S, as mentioned in the 
preceding section, calmed securities registration worries abroad, fraud regulation, despite 
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the tests developed by the U.S. Courts, still creates unstable conditions in the 
international marketplace.74  Despite the initial tendency of many to believe that SOX 
drastically disrupts this already shaky balance, in reality this is not the case.   
In fact, the tenets of SOX that specifically refer to its international application 
entirely relate to the activity of those firms already registered on the U.S. capital 
market.75  Ironically, SOX technically falls under the guidance of Regulation S and its 
specific rules regarding international entities.  Regulation S is essentially the weight that 
keeps the unstable investment environment in balance by respecting international 
sovereignty and calming international compliance concerns.76  This leads one to conclude 
that Sarbanes-Oxley would not tip the historic balance and this conclusion could not be 
farther from the truth. 
It is important to emphasize that the Act does not impose its requirements on just 
any international party.  SOX simply affects those foreign firms already registered on the 
U.S. market, or choose to register in the future, and are voluntarily complying with 
existing U.S. securities laws.77  Although compliance is an additional cost associated with 
access to U.S. stock exchanges, as long as international firms continue to feel as though 
the benefits of the U.S. market exceed the costs listed firms face, they will likely maintain 
their listing in the U.S.78  Since the issuance of SOX, however, the sudden decrease in 
foreign listings on the market in the United States suggests that foreign firms are now 
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perceiving the costs of listing to be in excess of the benefits.79  Foreign de-listing creates 
a lose-lose situation for U.S. citizens and foreigners alike and ultimately makes it 
possible to conclude that the imposition of U.S. laws on foreign corporations is not in 
anyone’s best interest. 
The major issue international critics have with Sarbanes-Oxley concerns its 
corporate governance rules.80  It is believed that Title III of the Act, titled Corporate 
Responsibility, is largely responsible for pushing foreign companies to either de-list from 
U.S. exchanges or decide not to enter the market in the first place.  The critics believe 
that it was one thing to voluntary follow past requirements to participate in the U.S. 
market, which primarily consisted of providing in-depth earnings information to 
regulators, but quite another to require that foreign companies rearrange their 
corporations in order to continue to list in the U.S.81  One source summarizes this conflict 
and explains, “Since controlling shareholders and banks have traditionally kept a closer 
watch on management in many foreign countries, much of the management-centered U.S. 
approach, such as strict disclosure of management self-interest and compensation, may be 
too oppressive and unnecessary in the case of foreign companies.”82  The intrinsic 
differences embedded in corporate architecture across different nations imply that the one 
size fits all mentality of Sarbanes-Oxley is not realistic for international companies. 
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The nature of SOX promotes an individualistic business environment that 
naturally conflicts with those nations whose cultures promote a collective environment.83  
This environmental variance is particularly true of Germany and Japan, two nations who 
possess a strong economic presence in the United States.84  Because SOX regulations 
were created with the intention to protect U.S. investors and U.S. corporations promote 
individual accountability, the regulations were designed to control for individual 
behavior.  On the other hand, Germany, whose market capitalization and foreign direct 
investment in the U.S. are approximately $287 billion and $35 billion, respectively, 
designed its corporate structure to reflect shared accountability.  Shared accountability 
reflects Germany’s collectivist culture.85  An issue now arises because German 
companies who list on U.S. exchanges are now subject to the regulations created under 
SOX.  Conflict will inevitably occur when imposing an individualistic regulation on a 
collectivist company.  The two-tier board structure of German corporations would make 
it nearly impossible to comply with the independence requirements under SOX and lacks 
a CEO figure to certify the company’s financial statements.86  The rigid nature of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, its indifference toward foreign nations, and the subsequent culture 
clashes, generate additional animosity toward the U.S. 
Another interesting challenge resulting from the imposition of SOX abroad is the 
inability to accurately translate some of the terms mentioned in the Act into certain 
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foreign languages.87  This is a direct result of the cultural differences and variable 
business norms that exist around the world.  Even if some of the phrases used in SOX are 
literally translated into a foreign language, the phrases will still lack meaning abroad 
because the context is unique to the U.S. business culture.  To illustrate, translation of 
SOX into the Japanese language has proved difficult because Japan is another culture that 
promotes a collective mentality.88  The term “officers” does not transfer to Japanese 
business terminology because this culture encourages companies to have boards that 
work together to govern corporations.  Therefore, the requirements of SOX that demand 
“officers” to act in a specific manner and the individual accountability of management in 
the U.S. have little or no meaning to the Japanese business culture.89  Additionally, the 
process used in Japan to select external auditors differs from U.S. practice and directly 
conflicts with the stringent independence standards under SOX.  Because Japan allows its 
shareholders to directly determine the external auditor for each company and the U.S. 
mandates independent audit committees to make the decision, there is another culture 
clash.90  Imposition of SOX independence standards on Japanese countries would 
override the cultural norms inherent to Japanese business processes. 
Ongoing negotiations between the SEC, PCAOB, and foreign representatives 
provide hope that the U.S. will soon compromise certain provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley to 
better suit international needs, such as corporate governance tenets, which differ in many 
instances from the U.S.91  The SEC and PCAOB have listened to these international 
                                                
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Hope of further Compromise with the SEC. International Accounting Bulletin, January 24, 2003. 8.  
 
 29 
concerns and have since responded in the following ways: (1) Granted permission to 
follow domestic corporate governance structure provided foreign firms complete a 
mandatory disclosure of the differences between the domestic structure and that of the 
U.S.; (2) Exceptions have been granted in limited cases when the Act’s provisions have 
conflicted with international laws, but never with respect to audit committee 
requirements; (3) Extended initial PCAOB registration deadline for foreign firms to July 
19, 2004; (4) Foreign firms are permitted to withhold sensitive information when 
registering with the Board if it is in conflict with their home country’s laws.  The firms 
must complete an extensive disclosure statement explaining the need to withhold the 
information from the Board in order to be granted the exemption; and (5) The PCAOB is 
collaborating with foreign regulators to conduct inspections abroad on its behalf.92  While 
these exemptions for foreign firms are a good start, the PCAOB and SEC still have a long 
way to go in order to diffuse international concerns. 
The permission granted to foreign accounting firms to withhold information from 
the Board that would violate its domestic laws was a significant step.  However, the 
process of earning this allowance is not as simple as it appears for foreign companies.  
Foreign entities now must endure a lengthy process of consents and waivers to obtain this 
exemption, at a cost inevitably passed onto the foreign accounting firms.93  Additionally, 
while the SEC has granted some relief to foreign companies under the controversial Title 
III by allowing home country practice to have precedence, it still mandates certain 
practices difficult to implement under foreign law, such as the audit committee 
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provisions.94  Finally, the decision of the PCAOB to extend the registration deadline for 
foreign accounting firms and exempt those firms from providing certain information 
normally required for registration but in violation of international laws was another 
considerable step for the Board.  However, the disclosure process to obtain this 
exemption is again timely and costly for foreign firms, further deepening the 
disadvantages faced by foreign companies in comparison to U.S. firms.95 
 
PART III 
Economic Impact 
 Foreign presence in the U.S. capital market has grown considerably in the past 
three decades and non-U.S. companies’ capital is vital to the health of the U.S. 
economy.96  The composition of the market, consisting of U.S. and foreign listed 
companies, has impacted SEC procedures and resulted in U.S. dependency on foreign 
market participation.  Former SEC Commissioner Roel Campos addressed the Center for 
European Policy Studies in Brussels on June 11, 2003 to discuss the importance of 
foreign companies to the U.S. market.97  During this speech, Campos encourages foreign 
participation provided the companies were prepared to comply with the SEC and its 
intent to protect investor interest.   
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The former Commissioner acknowledges his presence in Europe as a means of 
opening dialogue to find a way to maintain, or even expand, the number of foreign 
issuers on the U.S. market while still achieving the SEC’s principal goal of protecting 
investors.98  Campos’ speech stresses the benefits of having foreign companies listed on 
U.S. exchanges and says the Commission is working to strike a balance between foreign 
participation and investor protection.  He states, “Shielding U.S. firms from foreign 
competition, however, would deprive U.S. investors of the benefits derived from the 
services and products offered by non-U.S. competitors.  [The SEC] also would do [the] 
economy a great disservice if we were to shelter our issuers, markets and intermediaries 
from competition.  We are striving for a balance that will result in fair, reasonable, and 
efficient markets.”99  In order to maintain a healthy economy, it is in the best interest of 
the United States for the SEC to discover this balance as soon as possible. 
 The number of foreign companies registering on the U.S. capital market has 
significantly declined since the release of SOX late in 2002.100  It appears that foreign 
corporations are beginning to believe that the costs of complying with the Act now 
exceed the benefits of the U.S. market.101  This will ultimately impact the economic 
situation in the U.S. and, as capital moves to markets located outside of the U.S., places 
the country at a severe disadvantage.  The hindrance SOX is causing to the economy by 
impairing the desirability of the U.S. market to foreign companies is hurting the economy 
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in a time when it is still suffering the effects of the accounting scandals and also the war 
in Iraq.102   
 Another source notes that, with respect to application of U.S. securities legislation 
to international entities, “the SEC has traditionally been lenient in subjecting non-U.S. 
issuers to new requirements by liberally granting exemptions from various provisions.”103  
Sarbanes-Oxley has been the exception to this norm, generating outrage from the 
international business community and creating impediments to a healthy economy.  
Critics have even charged the U.S. as attempting to act as a “global regulator” of 
securities and insist that SOX creates an “anti-competitive” environment that denies 
foreign firms access to the same economic opportunities as U.S. companies.104  Although 
the U.S. market has historically generated great wealth for listed companies and their 
investors, there is concern that the “biggest pool of capital on earth” may no longer be 
characteristic of the U.S. market if foreign firms look elsewhere to list in order to avoid 
the implications of the Act.105   
 The potential for Sarbanes-Oxley to have “a chilling impact on transnational 
trade” for the U.S. has led many corporations to examine the attractiveness of foreign 
stock exchanges in lieu of U.S. exchanges.106  The simple fact that the Act is causing 
corporations to pursue listings outside of the U.S. in order to avoid intensive and costly 
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regulation proves that Sarbanes-Oxley is not necessarily the key to the problems of the 
world’s accounting system.107  Furthermore, it is becoming very apparent that this 
legislation is intensifying the economic downturn in the United States and the economy 
will continue to worsen as foreign companies decide to de-list as a means of avoiding the 
reach of SOX.108  As mentioned before, the decision to list on capital markets involves a 
careful cost-benefit analysis.  The costs associated with listing on stock exchanges result 
from regulation and compliance costs.109  It is these costs that allow listed companies to 
access the benefits of the markets and the wealth they seek to obtain.  The strict 
regulation of markets works to prevent fraud and provide investors with the highest 
amount of protection available.110  In the past, the U.S. capital market consistently 
produced benefits that outweighed the costs of regulation.  This was the case until the 
Sarbanes-Oxley, however now the market’s benefits “are suddenly obscured by the 
intrusion of the highly developed and complex U.S. regulatory regime.”111 
 Consequently, U.S. stock exchanges are now left to address the decline in foreign 
company participation in the market, a component that has been vital to the strength of 
the U.S. economy during the rise in globalization.112  European companies are a vital 
component of the U.S. economy but, at the same time, are strongly opposed to the 
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implications of the Act.  In reality, the problem SOX poses for European companies 
could indeed be the motivator the EU needs to knock down national barriers and political 
differences it struggles with in order to form a unified EU economy, complete with its 
own securities and oversight institutions.113  This unification could mean trouble for the 
U.S. because it would face an economy closer to its size and level of power.  
Additionally, the U.S. could potentially find itself in the unfavorable position of 
answering to multiple regulatory regimes if the EU decides to require non-EU firms listed 
on EU exchanges to comply with its regulations. 
 The U.S. will need to continue to watch foreign reactions to Sarbanes-Oxley and 
international acceptance of its securities regulations, especially since the London Stock 
Exchange has begun to advertise its market as a favorable alternative to U.S. 
exchanges.114  A Wall Street Journal article notes, “A recent London Stock Exchange 
survey of 80 international companies that went public on its markets found that of those 
that had contemplated a U.S. listing, 90% decided Sarbanes-Oxley made London more 
attractive.”115  German car manufacturer Porsche revealed that Section 906 of the Act, 
which addresses mandatory CEO/CFO certification of financial statements, is the primary 
cause of its decision not to register as planned on the New York Stock Exchange.116  
Porsche believes that the collectivist system of management, which reflects the essence 
of German culture, does not place the same value on a CEO or CFO in the company and 
its management system would not be compatible with the system of management 
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described in SOX.117  In addition to Porsche, the Japanese company Daiwa, has also 
decided to wait to list on the NYSE exchange.118  In support of its decision, Daiwa states, 
“We didn’t know what the rules of the game we’d be playing would be.”119  Daiwa 
executives chose to not enter the U.S. market to avoid subjecting the company to SOX 
before it was evident how it would impact international companies.  If the U.S. continues 
down this path and does not address the significant impact of SOX on the U.S. economy, 
one source predicts that the result will create “ a bite far worse than the bark of Sarbanes-
Oxley.”120 
Legal Impact 
 Sarbanes-Oxley has also had significant impact on the scope of U.S. law and the 
legal profession since its creation.  One source states, “Such international application of 
Sarbanes-Oxley creates issues such as duplication of regulatory burdens, inconsistent 
regulatory requirements and laws, cultural differences, and concerns of sovereignty and 
comity.”121  Foreign companies listed in the United States will be subject to the U.S. 
courts system per the Act, an issue that generates more negative reactions abroad and 
produces accusations that the U.S. is interfering with foreign nations’ freedom from 
outside intervention and their right to self-govern.122  The potential for legal conflict is 
endless for foreign entities under SOX.  Answering to multiple regulatory regimes 
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ultimately means that firms must adhere to multiple laws and the subsequent enforcement 
of the laws.  KPMG “warned of legal impediments to transnational oversight and 
discipline” and is concerned that double jeopardy could come into play if an auditor is 
prosecuted both in its home country as well as in the U.S. for violating each nations’ 
respective laws.123 
 It has been traditional practice and characteristic of basic foreign diplomacy to not 
apply domestic laws extra-territorially.  Former Supreme Court Chief Justice Rehnquist 
has spoken against extraterritorial reach of the law because disallowing it permits nations 
around the world to respectively co-exist in peace with one another.124  When this respect 
is not granted, tension erupts between governments around the world.  Former Supreme 
Court Justice Holmes, a notable American judge who was on the Supreme Court from 
1902 to 1932, once said, “The general and almost universal rule is that the character of an 
act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the 
act is done.”125  That said, the intent of Sarbanes-Oxley to expand the reach of this Act to 
foreign corporations and accounting firms operating under the laws of another nation 
goes against this bedrock principal of one of America’s most respected judges. 
 In the most extreme cases, there have been a limited number of situations in 
which the extraterritorial application of one nation’s law onto another’s has been 
warranted.  In order to preserve U.S. foreign relations, the Courts have devised a process 
to determine whether such an extreme situation exists to apply a U.S. law outside 
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sovereign borders.126  The Effects Test previously mentioned in PART II determines if 
the U.S. has subject matter jurisdiction to pursue a claim internationally.127  Additionally, 
the courts test for the reasonableness of the claim, weighing the interests of both nations 
involved, and this test is known as the Restatement Test.128  This test evaluates eight 
factors, which are:  
(1) Substantiality of effect; 
(2) The connections of the defendant with the forum; 
(3) Character of the activity; 
(4) Existence of justified expectations; 
(5) Importance of regulation; 
(6) Extent to which the regulation is with international norms; 
(7) Extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; 
(8) The likelihood of conflict with another nation.129 
 
Applying the Restatement Test to enforcing Sarbanes-Oxley abroad, it is not warranted to 
impose this legislation outside U.S. borders, mainly due to the strong weight of the final 
two factors of the test.130  Evaluation of the seventh factor does not support 
extraterritorial reach because accounting oversight is not unique to the United States.  
There are in fact other nations who possess a strong interest in accounting oversight of 
their domestic corporations and accounting firms, meaning these nations possess laws of 
their own to enforce.  In addition, because foreign nations have their own regulatory 
institutions for oversight, imposition of the U.S. oversight system would invade their 
domestic institutions and threaten to create conflict from U.S. intrusion. 
 Utilizing numerous theoretical models developed both under the law and within 
the academic arena, the same conclusion is reached: The extraterritorial application of 
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Sarbanes-Oxley has no legitimacy and violates fundamental tenets of international 
relations.131  In order to avoid conflict with other nations, and their respective laws and 
institutions, Sarbanes-Oxley should not be imposed on non-U.S. companies to the extent 
it originally allows.  Aside from its apparent lack of extraterritorial legitimacy, SOX 
would also cause problems because the legal environments of foreign nations differ 
greatly from that of the U.S.132  The U.S. legal system is comprised of both civil and 
common law.  However, in other countries throughout the world, legal systems only have 
civil laws.133   
This distinction is important because of the manner in which common laws are 
created.  Previous legal disputes and their subsequent verdicts create precedence, thus 
forming the basis for the common law system.134  With respect to SOX, an important 
common law that has substantially evolved over time refers to professional duty of care.  
This common law ultimately exists to protect investors and legally hold professionals to 
provide a minimal level of care in their conduct.135  In those countries that operate only 
under a civil law system, however, this protection is provided under alternative measures.  
For example, in France, it is typical for the state to control a sizeable portion of large 
corporations.  Therefore, the standard of duty of care is implicit because of the 
government’s financial interest and ownership role in the corporation.136  On the 
occurrence of corporate scandals, one source notes, “If that misconduct occurs in a 
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French corporation and it relates to the duty of care, what standard of the duty of care is 
the attorney to use?  The standard honed through U.S. law or that of French law?”137  
Thus, holding lawyers and other professionals to a duty of care standard as developed by 
the U.S. is not applicable to many legal systems abroad and, in many cases, the existing 
foreign legal system may already protect against corporate misconduct.    
The bottom line is that Sarbanes-Oxley poses serious legal implications for 
governments and companies around the world.  Extraterritorial application of the Act will 
likely result in serious clashes of law around the world, making it even more challenging 
and costly for public corporations and the accounting firms that audit them.  The majority 
of claims thus far are purely hypothetical; however, the day that real conflict of law 
originates may not be too far ahead.  In the event that the hypothetical becomes reality, 
whose laws are appropriate for foreign entities to follow: their domestic laws or U.S. 
laws?  This question of legitimacy is one that the Board and U.S. government must 
actively work to resolve before it permanently impairs its international relations. 
Political Impact 
 Business actors, especially multi-national corporations, possess the strength to 
influence the activities of governments worldwide.  The ability to influence political 
regimes and dominate the political agendas of various nations shows that business units 
and the state are by no means mutually exclusive concepts.138  Recent research has 
attempted to explain the “mediating, regulatory, and sometimes even interventionist role 
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of governments and state agencies” with respect to business enterprises.139  With the 
onset of globalization, especially in the past thirty years, governments have begun to 
exhibit a business-oriented approach to policy decisions.140   
Because the convergence of the world economy and transnational trade are now 
commonplace, business activity often dominates the government’s agenda.  Intense 
economic competition, both domestic and international, has led many governments to 
center their agendas around business activity.  Business activity leads to economic 
prosperity and, ultimately, to obtaining the goal nations worldwide seek: power.141  Hans-
Jurgen Bieling, in his article from Business and Politics, explains: 
Within this fundamentally changed global environment, social and political 
entities such as the state can only adjust to the overwhelming external pressures of 
global competition.  If they ignore these pressures and try to resist, they must be 
ready to cope with substantial welfare loss, which in turn may stimulate a 
reorientation of large parts of the electorate.142 
This relatively new orientation of governments toward business entities has yet to be 
extensively researched.  Further research on the relationship between business and 
politics is necessary to fully understand the convergence and development of these two 
different, but now intertwined, disciplines.143  However, with the foundation of research 
Bieling provides, it is possible to extrapolate from his theories the impact Sarbanes-Oxley 
has had on U.S. politics.   
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 Globalization has substantially impacted the interrelationship between business 
and politics in recent years.  The creation of Sarbanes-Oxley undoubtedly demonstrates 
this relationship, revealing the pressure businesses exert on the government and vice 
versa.  In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom collapses in 2002 that left millions of 
everyday investors financially devastated, American citizens cried out for politicians to 
take action against those responsible for their financial ruin and also to prevent another 
scandal of such magnitude.  The government’s subsequent response to the pressure from 
constituents reinforces Beiling’s theory that the state must act in a manner that is 
competitive internationally while simultaneously responding to the demands of its 
domestic citizens.144  If the state fails to make policy decisions that are favored by 
constituents and are globally competitive, politicians risk losing their positions and the 
powers associated with them.  For this reason, U.S. politicians created Sarbanes-Oxley, 
which, with its treatment of foreign companies, sends the message to constituents that the 
government is concerned about both their interest and staying competitive in the 
international economy. 
 Numerous bills were drafted in response to U.S. citizens’ concern over the 
accounting scandals of 2002.  Over a time span of less than six months, Sarbanes-Oxley 
was signed into law on July 30, 2002.145  In mid-July, WorldCom officially filed for 
bankruptcy and it became evident that a corporate reform law was needed to crack down 
on corporate misconduct.146  One source reports, “The name of Rep. Michael G. Oxley 
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(R-Ohio) wasn't added to the bill until a last-minute concession by House Republicans 
after the WorldCom scandal broke and public opinion began to sway in favor of the 
Democrats as the November 2002 elections were approaching.”147   
In response to the political pressure on the government, President Bush 
announced in late July that Congress would not be allowed to begin summer recess, 
which traditionally begins on August 1st each year, until it had created a corporate reform 
act.148  As a result, Congressmen Paul Sarbanes and Mike Oxley worked for 72 hours 
straight in the last week of July to draft the official Act.149  Congress voted on the bill on 
July 25, 2002 and the majority of Congress had already left for summer recess when 
President Bush signed the bill into law on July 30th.150  The storm with which SOX hit 
Capital Hill was unprecedented and, at the time, few in the accounting profession 
understood the full implications of the new legislation.  One source comments on this era 
and notes, “The political pressure was unrelenting, with criticism of the SEC coming 
from every angle as the U.S. public took up the rallying cry for corporate reform.”151  
With that, Congress passed the most sweeping form of securities legislation in U.S. 
history since the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 
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 Congressional leaders opposed to this bill were few and far between.  The Senate 
passed SOX unanimously and the House reported only 3 dissenting votes out of 426.152  
Congressmen Jeff Flake of Arizona expressed his dissatisfaction with both the Act and 
the speed with which it was passed.153  While Flake agrees with the need to reform 
accounting oversight in the U.S., he believes that SOX is not the ideal answer and that 
Congress should have taken the time to create a piece of legislation that would not have 
generated the amount of repercussions that this act did.154  Flake states, “This hastily 
created legislation is more of an attempt to politically inoculate ourselves rather than to 
pass a meaningful bill that cracks down on corporate malfeasance.”155  Congressman Ron 
Paul of Texas also expresses discontent with the Act and believes that Congress could 
have created a law that punishes corporate misconduct without positioning the United 
States for the amount of international backlash it received after the passage of SOX.156 
 Apart from the political repercussions U.S. lawmakers faced upon the creation of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, continued pressure is being exerted on U.S. politicians over costly 
provisions of the bill and the limited number of exemptions granted to foreign entities by 
the PCAOB thus far.  One source points out that “in the post-Enron environment, it has 
become politically risky to provide accounting exemptions to anyone.”157  As a result, it 
appears that the SEC and the Board fear the political reaction in the U.S. to granting 
exemptions, especially to foreign companies, over the favorable political reactions abroad 
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and economic benefits of allowing such exemptions.  U.S. political relations with the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan have been strained from the imposition of 
Sarbanes-Oxley and these developed countries are outraged that the U.S. will not honor 
their respective systems of oversight.158  The argument in the UK is that the government 
already has a corporate oversight system in place that it has been carefully developing 
and refining for several years.159  Public companies in the UK must comply with the 
Smith Guidance System.  Therefore, one source notes, “The comprehensive protections 
against auditing problems contained in the Smith Guidance make the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
requirements unnecessarily duplicative for UK corporations.”160  The UK government 
does not believe that, with a respectable oversight system already in operation, the UK 
also needs the U.S. oversight system imposed on companies as well.  In the opinion of 
UK officials, who is to say that the U.S. system is any better than that of the UK?161 
 On the other hand, American politicians argue that they are dubious about the 
unwillingness of foreign counterparts to comply with legislation that, in their opinion, 
protects investors by providing the utmost level of professional care and 
accountability.162  After the occurrence of such disgraces as Enron, politicians who were 
in office at the time of those events are dedicated to preventing future incidents and are 
unwilling to compromise the provisions of the very act created to safeguard against this.  
An interesting political theory that sheds light onto this extraterritorial regulation debate 
is the Issuer Choice Theory.   
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The Issuer Choice Theory stipulates that companies worldwide should have the 
power to decide which regulatory regime they will comply with, similar to the manner 
that U.S. companies decide the state in which they will incorporate.163  Under this theory, 
the regulatory environment a company chooses to abide by is then respected by all 
regulatory systems throughout the world.164  In addition, reconciliation or disclosure of 
differing practices would not be required if a company is publicly-listed on exchanges 
outside of its regulatory nation in the same way a U.S. company does not have to 
reconcile its actions to the rule of the states it operates in, but is not the state of its 
incorporation.165  This theory of political cooperation is interesting to ponder, but 
unlikely to receive the support of the United States in the near future.  It has been 
hypothesized that “given Congressional hostility to providing foreign exemptions in 
Sarbanes-Oxley, it is unlikely that the United States will start making whole scale 
recognitions of other countries’ securities laws anytime soon.  Indeed, the current 
political climate appears to favor tighter regulation for all issuers, whether domestic or 
foreign.”166  Consequently, in place of pursuing an alternative arrangement that could 
provide tighter accounting oversight and more favorable international relations, the U.S. 
is politically isolating itself in the hopes of avoiding further protest from the American 
public regarding its business regulation practices. 
Implications for U.S. Foreign Relations 
Foreign relations are the foundation upon which nations throughout the world 
manage to peacefully coexist with one another.  It is inevitable that these relations suffer 
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from events that create conflict among nations and, when this occurs, the conflict must be 
addressed to restore balance to the world’s affairs.  As one source comments, “From time 
to time, relations between the United States and other states are strained by actions that 
others look upon as extraterritorial.”167  Sarbanes-Oxley is no exception to this comment 
as it has been perceived by foreign nations as a U.S. attempt to super-impose its domestic 
laws throughout the world.  The young legislation has exerted continuous pressure on 
U.S. foreign relations since its 2002 issuance. 
Extraterritoriality disputes in reaction to U.S.-dominant behavior and attempts to 
control the actions of foreign nations are not new to U.S. foreign relations.  Consider past 
U.S. economic and political boycotts, especially during the Cold War with respect to 
Russia, Cuba, and China, that at the time represented the core of U.S. foreign relations.168  
The decision to implement the boycotts derived in the U.S. because it was in line with 
American political self-interest.  U.S. threat to penalize its allies that continued to trade 
with boycotted nations demonstrates the U.S. desire to dictate the actions of other 
countries to align with its own.  If foreign nations did not align with the U.S., those 
countries found themselves in the unfavorable position of an adversary to the U.S.169 
 Many wonder if Sarbanes-Oxley in coming years will continue to face the 
resentment, politically, socially, and economically, as past situations involving business 
and trade aspects of foreign relations in the U.S., have produced.  It is still unclear 
whether the decision to leave or not enter the U.S. capital market at all will be temporary 
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or permanent as a result of SOX.170  This law is not even six years old and the registration 
deadline for foreign accounting firms was only two years earlier.  As a result, it is still 
uncertain how this landmark U.S. securities law will mingle in practice with other foreign 
laws.171  It is believed by some academics that once the legislation is completely 
amended and finalized, foreign investors will once again flock to the U.S. capital 
market.172  On the other hand, opponents of the Act believe that SOX will negatively 
impact foreign investment in the U.S. permanently.173  Regardless of which school of 
thought ultimately is correct, it is apparent that SOX is causing severe damage to the U.S. 
image among foreign investors and currently influencing their decision to invest in the 
U.S. 
 The nature of Sarbanes-Oxley and its implications for foreign entities make this 
Act not only a securities reform law, but also a significant component of U.S. foreign 
relations.  The implications for foreign relations were either not considered during the 
drafting of SOX or else ignored by lawmakers in the process.  Lawrence Cunningham, a 
professor of law at Boston College, states, “Political blindness to the international 
relations viewpoint was evident from the US failure to consult regulatory counterparts 
abroad and from the heated political rhetoric accompanying SOX.”174  The lack of regard 
for international practices and the reaction to imposing the requirements of the Act 
outside U.S. borders has brought Sarbanes-Oxley to the forefront of U.S. foreign 
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relations.  This undoubtedly could have been avoided and saved U.S. relations from the 
damage it incurred had the U.S. taken foreign concerns into account prior to super-
imposing legislation extraterritorially. 
 Many claims have risen that the U.S. is overstepping its bounds with Sarbanes-
Oxley and is blatantly violating the basic norms of respecting international 
sovereignty.175  In today’s globalized world, markets are becoming increasingly 
international and are inexorably intertwined with one another as a result.176  
Communication between all countries is necessary to allow for this type of global 
marketplace in order to understand the laws and cultural norms each nation brings to the 
table for trade.  The United States’ decision to essentially disregard communication with 
other nations during the creation of Sarbanes-Oxley and the subsequent passage of the 
law has resulted in concern among foreign nations over American imperialist-like 
activities.177 
 Graham Ward, a board member of the International Federation of Accountants, is 
opposed to Sarbanes-Oxley and points to the U.S. struggle for independence in the 18th 
century to demonstrate why he believes SOX is a hypocritical imposition of regulation on 
the part of the U.S.178  He quotes American values embedded in the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence, stressing that a nation’s rulers “derive their just powers from the consent 
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of the governed.”179  Ward argues that Sarbanes-Oxley represents the very opposite of 
this sacred American value.  By imposing the regulations of this Act on entities outside of 
the control of the U.S. government and also without their consent, the U.S. is withholding 
basic rights that centuries ago it fought so hard to obtain.180  SOX leads to feelings of 
repression among foreign nations, whose affected companies now must comply with a 
stringent law created in another nation and without foreign consultation. 
 The tenets of SOX in theory provide the SEC with jurisdiction outside the U.S., 
calling into question the comity of the international community and straining foreign 
relations as a result.181  The U.S. government now must answer to the international 
community and its demand for granting exemptions to foreign entities.182  It is interesting 
to note that Congress and President Bush are celebrated by U.S. constituents for the 
creation of the Act and protecting their interests in the wake of such scandals as Enron 
and WorldCom.  However, when U.S. foreign relations exploded from the international 
reaction to SOX, the very politicians who endorsed the legislation turned to the SEC to 
deal with the conflict, probably out of fear of losing voter support.  The SEC is now left 
to address the political pressure coming in full force from two different directions: 
domestic supporters of SOX and international objectors to it.  While the SEC is faced 
with the daunting task of cleaning up this political mess, Congress is patting itself on the 
back for creating a law it believes will protect everyday U.S. investors from future 
accounting scandals.  It is evident that “in the future, when Congress regulates US capital 
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markets and SEC registrants, it should not punt to the SEC to hedge the resulting 
international relations fall-out but address that thicket up front.”183 
 Congress’s disregard for Sarbanes-Oxley’s impact abroad during the U.S.’s mad 
rush to put an end to the disastrous corporate scandals is apparent.  However, consultation 
with other nations and their government, business and legal professionals might have 
prevented the U.S. from the foreign relations debacle it is currently in as a result of this 
statute.184  The fact that corporate governance and oversight is by no means a one size fits 
all model, the institutional differences that invariably exist throughout the world imply 
that the U.S. model simply does not fit the needs of many nations.185  This breeds 
animosity toward the U.S. and one source condemns Congress “for neglecting to consider 
the diplomatic consequences of such far-reaching and unilateral actions such as Sarbanes-
Oxley.”186   
The main takeaway from SOX and its negative reaction abroad is that Congress 
should have first only applied the Act to domestic companies.187  This would have 
satisfied the U.S. citizenry’s cry for government action after the corporate misconduct 
and also provided the opportunity for U.S.-foreign dialogue.  The dialogue would have 
addressed treatment of non-U.S. firms in the hopes of developing a solution that would 
protect investors, ease foreign concerns, and save the U.S. from irreparable damage to its 
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foreign relations.188  Instead, the U.S. plowed ahead with Sarbanes-Oxley and created an 
obstacle to open trade in today’s global marketplace.189  Cunningham describes the fast-
moving actions of the U.S. and their subsequent consequences by saying, “It was a case 
of domestic political pressures blinding lawmakers to important matters of international 
relations.  It was a wasted opportunity to exhibit comity in the exercise of US power on a 
matter that would have cost the US little.”190  His comments reiterate a fundamental 
principal of foreign relations theory: diplomacy as a preventative measure often serves in 
the best interest of all and usually results in conflict avoidance.  Had the U.S. practiced 
proactive diplomacy prior to the imposition of the Act abroad, it is likely that it could 
have avoided the backlash that resulted in response to SOX. 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s divergence from the traditional practice in foreign relations of 
avoiding international economic conflict, or to at least initially engage in dialogue as a 
preventive measure, severely impacts foreign perception of the U.S. and the 
attractiveness of the U.S. market.191  Foreign companies in the past have not taken 
significant issue with complying with U.S. securities laws because the regulation has 
traditionally adapted provisions in order to meet international needs.192  After SOX, non-
U.S. companies are confused by Congress’s sudden shift in accommodation and angered 
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at the impact the law has on their business practices.193  Consequently, the U.S. is trying, 
after the fact, to repair the damage SOX has generated abroad in lieu of addressing the 
Act’s impact and U.S. response to it beforehand. 
The U.S., in keeping with its traditional receptiveness to the international 
implications of its securities laws, should have engaged in open diplomacy with foreign 
regulators and affected companies prior to imposing the Act abroad.  Cunningham 
purports, “If this were done with SOX, the world would have arrived at the same place, 
without undesirable political agitation, anxiety, and backlash risks.  This underscores the 
international relations aspect of US corporate regulation amid globalization.”194  The SEC 
is now engaged in dialogue with its foreign counterparts and attempting to satisfy the 
international community’s demands while trying to balance domestic political interests at 
the same time.195  SEC representatives stress that the Commission does not want the 
international companies to be placed in an unfeasible situation where they are facing 
conflicts of law, but also emphasizes that its number one responsibility is protecting the 
U.S. investment community.196   
As a result, “the SEC has indicated that in certain areas it will take into account 
foreign laws and practices in applying the provisions to foreign accounting firms.”197  
The international community is paying close attention to the SEC and the fulfillment of 
its vows to address foreign interests.  In fact, former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt was 
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going to skip an EU conference on SOX, citing political tensions in the U.S. as his excuse 
for not attending.198  However, EU representatives stressed the importance of his 
presence to show the SEC’s commitment to its foreign counterparts and working together 
to resolve differences resulting from SOX.199  Ultimately, Pitt wisely attended the 
conference and avoided creating further damage to U.S. foreign relations. 
Other critics chastise Sarbanes-Oxley as being too “US-centric,” claiming that the 
burden of this legislation abroad naturally conflicts with existing foreign institutions.  In 
addition, the international community perceives the U.S. as having an ethnocentric view 
with respect to its accounting system.200  Instead, the U.S. needs to recognize the 
American cultural norms embedded in the Act and that foreign cultures do not always 
reflect these same norms.  In recognizing this seemingly obvious fact, the U.S. should 
accommodate to the differences rather than giving the impression that foreign companies 
must conform to the American way if they wish to continue to participate in the U.S. 
market.201  International entities’ impression of Sarbanes-Oxley is essentially that the 
U.S. believes its business culture is superior and all others are innately inferior and 
deficient.202  It conveys the message to foreigners that they must adopt the U.S. business 
structure necessary to comply with SOX or else look to participate in capital markets 
outside of the U.S., irrespective of the cultural roots of their domestic business 
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environment.203  As one source notes, “Ultimately, in order to adopt SOX’s corporate 
governance model, foreign corporations are forced to either compromise or abandon their 
own cultural values.”204  The intrinsically individualistic nature of SOX is appropriate for 
the U.S. culture, however this could not be farther from the truth for cultures that promote 
collectivism.205  
It is ironic to Europeans that the U.S. suffered from corporate scandals despite its 
belief in the superiority of the U.S. accounting system and standards.206  Furthermore, 
many perceive the United States’ attempt to correct the business environment in which 
the scandals were able to occur and impose the new regulations abroad without 
international consideration as insulting.207  Although other nations are not entirely free 
from similar corporate scandals, perhaps the most well known international scandal is 
Italy’s Parmalat fiasco, it is commonly believed that these scandals are “very much an 
American phenomenon.”208  Consequently, internationally there is a tendency for 
professionals to reject the integrity of the U.S. regulation system or, at the very least, an 
inclination to question the new Act, which dictates that foreign public companies and 
their auditors adopt its regulations.   
Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, the international business community was striving to 
converge accounting practices worldwide.  Unfortunately, the introduction of SOX 
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severely impairs U.S. foreign relations with other nations to achieve this goal.209  Those 
nations who are committed to finding a common solution to the international problem of 
accounting oversight that will suit the needs of the globalized economy were offended by  
the U.S.’s decision to rashly pass this law without foreign consultation.  Dialogue is a key 
component of international relations and is what countries worldwide have been utilizing 
to develop a system of accounting oversight suitable for many nations of varying cultural 
and institutional backgrounds.210  SOX has damaged the perception abroad that the U.S. 
is willing and supportive of working together to develop an international system.  
Opponents of the Act argue, “Regulators in the United States should abandon efforts to 
extraterritorially impose [its] corporate governance legislation and instead work towards 
a global regulatory regime.”211  On the other hand, it is possible that Congress’s decision 
to pass the Act without discussion with its foreign counterparts could bar the U.S. from 
future participation in the development of a worldwide oversight system if its foreign 
relations have been too damaged.  Had the United States been an active proponent of 
foreign dialogue initially, it would not find itself in a position where the rest of the world 
is opposed to the U.S. system and could potentially devise a system of its own without 
consulting the U.S. 
It is believed that the U.S. could face retribution in the form of international 
legislation similar in scope to Sarbanes-Oxley.  One source states, “Foreign regulatory 
bodies have threatened to retaliate against U.S. firms by imposing requirements similar to 
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those of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”212  Imagine the endless number of oversight systems 
that would emerge if every other nation in the world chose to develop their own 
regulation laws without consulting its international counterparts in the same manner the 
U.S. developed SOX.  If this were to occur, in theory, a multinational company would 
have to comply with its home laws as well as the laws of over 190 other countries if the 
company was active in each nation in the world.  This clearly demonstrates the 
importance of foreign relations worldwide and the need for every nation to be diplomatic 
out of consideration of the impact its laws and actions have on the international 
community. 
The Congressional hearings for the Act did not provide an opportunity for foreign 
regulators to voice their concerns about the proposed legislation before it was 
extraterritorially imposed on their domestic companies who are listed in the U.S. or 
participate in the audits of listed companies.213  Although it is not required under U.S. law 
to provide this opportunity, the United States would have saved the blow to its foreign 
relations by granting this courtesy to foreign nations.214  One source comments, “On the 
road to promoting investor protection and stable markets, […] there is not just one right 
path.  Countries have different regulatory approaches and different legal, political and 
economic systems that must be respected and taken into account.”215  Congress’s decision 
to ignore these inherent differences and create SOX generated a negative reaction abroad 
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and could impact PCAOB and SEC attempts to enforce the new law in the future.  
Without foreign support, it will be challenging for the U.S. to gain the support it needs to 
ensure foreign compliance with SOX, thus defeating the purpose of extending the Act’s 
reach to include international entities.216  Undoubtedly, the biggest error of Congress was 
not addressing existing foreign oversight systems in the process of generating Sarbanes-
Oxley.   
Congress’s lack of regard for the international impact of SOX strains foreign 
relations with some of the United States’ long-standing allies and trade partners.217  As 
Cunningham wisely advises, “The world’s unipower owes its friends respect, particularly 
friends whose own history is marked by global preeminence.”218  Although the future of 
Sarbanes-Oxley is not certain, it is clear that the United States’ actions, or lack thereof, 
toward foreign nations have not been well received.  If the U.S. continues down this 
ethnocentric path of regulation that is severely damaging its foreign relations, it will risk 
isolating itself from the international community.  Moreover, the powerful nation could 
lose its power to those nations who reject SOX and successfully draw public companies 
away from the U.S. capital market toward other markets that operate under a more 
flexible regulatory environment.  The U.S. should focus on repairing tensions with its 
allies as a result of this Act and in the future strive to avoid creating an extraterritorial 
nightmare for its foreign relations. 
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PART IV  
Demand for Alternative Solutions 
 As the arguments in the preceding sections of the paper illustrate, Congress’s 
creation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, while intended to protect investors’ interests, did not 
succeed in developing an oversight solution that is accepted throughout the world.  The 
economic, legal and political problems generated by SOX has impacted the standing of 
the U.S. worldwide and jeopardized its foreign relations with many nations, including its 
closest allies.  As a result, there has been considerable demand for the U.S. to amend 
some of its provisions with respect to those involving foreign entities.  Because of 
domestic political provisions, the U.S. has been hesitant to grant exemptions to foreign 
firms from the Act.  However, there are two alternative paths the U.S. can proceed down 
to rectify the international conflict created by the Act.  The first alternative involves 
working with foreign nations to develop an international body of accounting oversight.  
The second alternative entails U.S. recognition of and reliance on foreign oversight 
systems to carry out the mission of the PCAOB. 
Alternative One: Development of an International Oversight Body 
 Adherence to multiple regulatory bodies is a costly and confusing process for 
entities worldwide.  Presently, foreign companies and accounting firms have been 
struggling to comply with their home country system, which may be in the process of 
undergoing significant change, as well as the complex U.S. regulatory environment 
developed under Sarbanes-Oxley.  It is believed that it would benefit business entities 
worldwide if regulatory systems from different nations were able to work together to 
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develop an international regulatory body charged with global accounting oversight.219  
Professionals would benefit from the development of a single set of rules, free from 
convoluted language, and applicable to many business cultures as opposed to just one.   
Graham Ward believes that creating a single, international system of regulation 
would provide the opportunity for economic growth throughout the world in place of the 
economic decline impacting nations similar to the way SOX affected the U.S. 
economy.220  One common international system would likely reduce the risk of fraud and 
corporate misconduct because everyone would be held to the same, accepted set of 
standards.221  One source states, “Just as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development has served as a useful forum for anti-trust and tax concern common to all 
governments, the International Organization of Securities Commissions would be the 
place to discuss common interests in securities regulation and corporate governance.”222  
It has been proposed that regulators around the world work to create an international 
auditing standard setting organization, utilizing the strengths of oversight systems 
currently in place and eliminating the weaknesses that exist in those systems.223  
Unfortunately, if the unwillingness of the SEC to compromise the U.S. GAAP system of 
accounting to conform with the International Accounting Standards Board’s rules is any 
indication, convergence to a global oversight system appears unlikely to succeed anytime 
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soon.224  The second proposed solution provides an alternative option to global 
convergence and may prove successful at least in the near future. 
Alternative Two: Mutual Recognition 
 A second alternative to Sarbanes-Oxley as originally proposed concerns the U.S. 
granting mutual recognition to those countries with a suitable accounting oversight 
system in place.  Because there are certain inherent differences among nations throughout 
the world, mutual recognition would recognize the legitimacy of other oversight systems 
while also respecting each nation’s right to sovereignty that is violated under the original 
tenets of SOX.225  Foreign entities believe that the U.S. should devise a system that would 
evaluate the credibility of foreign oversight systems and determine whether to accept 
these systems as quasi-equivalent to the U.S. system.226  This would remove the 
extraterritorial component of the Act for the most part while still achieving the primary 
objective of SOX: protecting investors. 
 The extent to which the U.S. would rely on foreign oversight systems is still 
highly contested.  Foreign nations urge the U.S. to consider full reliance on the system if 
it is deemed acceptable by the PCAOB.  On the other hand, the PCAOB recognizes that 
mutual recognition would allow greater respect of institutional and legal differences 
inherent to oversight systems throughout the world, but does not support the idea of full 
reliance.227  Partial reliance on foreign systems is under consideration by the Board and 
the SEC defends its actions, saying that “the SEC, as well as any national regulator, has 
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the right to determine the terms and conditions under which financial service providers 
access investors in its jurisdiction.”228  Cunningham discusses a classification system for 
countries appropriate for a mutual recognition system, regardless of the degree of 
recognition the U.S. grants.  He believes that nations will be classified as one of two 
types: Favored Nations or World Class Countries.229  The U.S. will perceive favored 
nations as having a satisfactory regulatory framework and World Class Countries will be 
those nations who lack an oversight system, but choose to implement and regulate U.S. 
standards.230   
If the U.S. devises a system to evaluate foreign oversight, it could greatly reduce 
negative perception of SOX, diminish inefficient regulation and enforcement, and 
simultaneously improve its foreign relations.  On the concept of mutual recognition, 
Cunningham states, “The key international relations benefit of such a measure is the 
result creates a measure of voluntary compliance compared to that generated by a 
unilateral fiat such as SOX.”231  In providing foreign nations the opportunity to either 
demonstrate the integrity of its domestic system or allow nations who lack a regulatory 
system to choose to implement the standards, the U.S. is ultimately acting in a manner 
that is more receptive to international needs.  The international community accepts this 
because foreign nations now play a greater role in their fate as opposed to its actions 
being dictated by the U.S. watchdog, as it appeared to be in the past. 
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The Development of Sarbanes-Oxley and the PCAOB 
The PCAOB has made considerable progress in the years that have passed since 
Sarbanes-Oxley was first issued.  The Board has recognized the impact of the Act abroad 
and the subsequent implications for U.S. foreign relations.  It has made significant 
advancements in its consultation with foreign counterparts and is proactive in promoting 
dialogue both with international regulators and professional auditors.  This dialogue has 
allowed the PCAOB to obtain a greater understanding of the perceptions that exist around 
the world about the provisions of SOX and rules that have been created by the Board.  
Additionally, complaints about the costliness of the Act have been declining because 
costs of compliance have been decreasing for public companies as they become more 
adept at satisfying the requirements of the Act.232  It is estimated that between 2006 and 
2007 compliance costs fell by 5.4% for companies, a statistic that has been well-received 
by those companies affected by SOX.  The remainder of this section discusses the 
specific steps recently taken by the PCAOB to address foreign concerns and promote 
dialogue as well as plans the Board has regarding its future strategy to achieve investor 
protection. 
 With registered public accounting firms representing over 85 countries throughout 
the world, the PCAOB has been working on the development of specific rules designed 
to specifically address treatment of foreign firms.233  The idea behind this series of rules 
is that the Board would rely under certain circumstances on inspections conducted by 
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foreign regulators.234  A country’s eligibility for this will depend on the characteristics of 
its domestic oversight system, especially with respect to the relationship between its 
regulators and auditors.235  Daniel L. Goelzer, a member of the Board, comments on the 
proposed rule concerning reliance on foreign regulation, stating, “This sliding scale 
approach permits the Board to be faithful to [its] Congressional mandate but at the same 
time to utilize the work of non-U.S. regulatory systems when that is consistent with our 
mandate.”236  Essentially, the PCAOB has come to realize that joint cooperation with 
foreign regulators could potentially provide greater investor protection because the 
involvement of more regulators results in access to greater resources and increases the 
total number of inspections completed.237  Meanwhile, foreign tensions are greatly 
diffused because foreign nations no longer feel completely violated by U.S. 
extraterritoriality.   
 In response to problems arising from the imposition of the Act abroad, the Board 
has established a system that evaluates whether the PCAOB is allowed to rely on foreign 
regulators to carry out the Board’s duties and to what extent.238  The Board has come to 
realize that cooperation with foreign regulators will “minimize administrative burdens 
and legal conflicts that firms face and […] conserve Board resources, without 
undermining or ignoring the Board’s statutory mandates.”239  As a result, the PCAOB has 
worked hard to develop and refine five new rules addressing its interpretation of mutual 
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recognition.  Upon the initial completion of these rules, the Board released them to 
auditing professionals and regulators for feedback on the implementation of the rules in 
practice.240  After receiving this valuable feedback, the PCAOB further revised the five 
rules to the form they exist in today. 
 The first of the five rules is Rule 4011, titled “Statement by Foreign Registered 
Public Accounting Firms.”  This rule describes a one-time statement created by those 
foreign firms who would like the Board to rely on a home country inspection.241  This 
statement must be certified by a company official and the PCAOB will work directly with 
the regulators of the firm’s home country to gain an understanding of its oversight 
system.242  The second rule, Rule 4012, “Inspections of Foreign Registered Public 
Accounting Firms,” discusses the criteria relied upon by the Board to evaluate foreign 
regulatory systems.243  The extent to which the Board will rely on foreign inspections 
depends on the evaluation of the following five factors: (1) System integrity; (2) 
Independence of regulators from auditors; (3) Source of funding; (4) Degree of system 
transparency; and (5) Past ability of the system to adequately perform.244  Rule 4012 also 
provides a clause stating the importance of Board dialogue with its foreign counterparts 
in order to establish a cooperative work arrangement.245   
 The next rule in the series, Rule 5113, titled “Reliance on the Investigations of 
Non-U.S. Authorities,” concerns the Board’s reliance upon foreign disciplinary actions 
not originally instigated by the United States.  This particular rule is still causing 
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international controversy because of double jeopardy concerns, implying that foreign 
entities could potentially face repercussions from multiple regulators in response to the 
same action.246  Despite feedback expressing dissatisfaction with Rule 5113, the Board 
will not relent, stating that foreign regulators’ objectives and the Board’s are not one and 
the same.247  Therefore, if one foreign company’s actions violate its home country law 
and U.S. law, it is still subject to discipline under both jurisdictions, a consequence firms 
should be aware of from operating across multiple jurisdictions.248   
 The final two rules, Rules 6001 and 6002, concern PCAOB policy of providing 
assistance to foreign regulators’ activities.249  Titled “Assisting non-U.S. Authorities in 
Inspections” and “Assisting non-U.S. Authorities in Investigations,” respectively, these 
rules address the right of the Board to help other nations enforce their own versions of 
SOX-like legislation with respect to U.S. public accounting firms.250  Although these 
actions are not defined specifically within the body of Sarbanes-Oxley, Rules 6001 and 
6002 are legitimized by the catch-all clause included in the Act.251  This clause authorizes 
the SEC the power to legally grant the PCAOB any powers it deems as necessary to 
carrying out the Board’s mission.252  Both the SEC and the PCAOB believe that Rules 
6001 and 6002 are consistent with the Board’s mission. 
 Although the introduction of these five rules represents a significant attempt on 
the part of the PCAOB to engage in cooperative dialogue with its foreign counterparts, 
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the Board is still not completely free from criticism.  The PCAOB is still opposed to a 
system of mutual recognition where it would completely rely on its foreign counterparts 
to carry out its mission and objectives.253  The Board claims that this “approach would 
[not] be in the interests of U.S. investors or the public.”254  The PCAOB believes that 
avoiding complete deference to foreign authorities allows it to maintain the right to step 
in at any time with the treatment of foreign registered firms if such a situation is 
warranted.255   
 Additionally, in response to the evaluation of the five factors to determine the 
Board’s reliance on foreign regulators, the PCAOB has expressed its intention to evaluate 
non-U.S. systems as a whole, rather than as a sum of its individual parts.256  One source 
criticizes the Board’s strict requirements to permit foreign oversight and deducts, “In 
other words, the PCAOB would rely on local oversight systems that were in essence 
structured the same as its own.”257  The Board believes it will achieve more objectivity 
toward its assessment of systems not identical to the U.S. oversight structure.258   
 Finally, although the PCAOB now encourages open discussion with 
representatives of foreign oversight systems during its evaluation of those systems, it has 
decided that once the Board has produced its final evaluation of the system, there will not 
be an appeal process for the international representatives to overturn the decision.259  The 
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PCAOB will only change its assessment of a particular oversight system if future changes 
were made to a country’s system thus strengthening the integrity of it.  This has not been 
well-received internationally because, in the event a country feels that the Board’s 
assessment is not reflective of its system, foreign regulators will not have the opportunity 
to argue against the evaluation. 
 The PCAOB recently released its Strategic Plan for 2008-2013 and a considerable 
portion of its plan has been dedicated to continuing its cooperative efforts with 
international regulators and companies.  Per the Board’s plan, one of its published goals 
is as follows: “Work effectively with international audit regulators to facilitate 
inspections of non-U.S. registered public accounting firms and to strengthen global 
oversight of U.S. public companies.”260  In addition, the PCAOB hopes to develop a more 
definitive policy describing its relationship and cooperation framework with its foreign 
regulatory counterparts.261  This represents a huge step for the Board to incorporate this 
goal into its agenda, although it fails to go describe in detail how it hopes to achieve this 
objective.  The PCAOB also plans to assume a leadership role within the global 
regulatory framework, hoping to both teach foreign regulators and learn from them, as 
long as the lessons are in line with the U.S. regulatory vision.262  This represents quite the 
contrast to the Board’s original stance toward the international community upon its 
creation. 
 In addition, the plan provides measures to evaluate PCAOB progress toward 
achieving its stated goals.  Currently, the Board has either performed the dictated number 
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of foreign accounting firm inspections directly, after obtaining foreign government 
permission, or in conjunction with foreign regulatory institutions.263  The PCAOB 
projects that it will inspect approximately 72 and 101 foreign firms in 2008 and 2009, 
respectively.  Futhermore, the Board has made considerable progress in recognizing the 
need for diplomatic relations with foreign nations in order to obtain their cooperation 
with PCAOB inspections or enforcement actions outside U.S. borders.264  In seeking to 
effectively work in conjunction with foreign regulators, the U.S. is not perceived as being  
as intrusive as it was when SOX first emerged.  Also, the PCAOB has created an 
international forum, known as the International Auditor Regulatory Institute, to not only 
address the idea of a global oversight system, but also to enhance international 
participants’ understanding of the Board’s methodology and rationale behind its 
standards.   
 By helping international regulators understand the Board’s activities, the PCAOB 
hopes to change the international perspective of SOX as an unwarranted imposition into a 
warranted measure intended to protect investors.  Although these steps have been 
significant for the PCAOB, in reality the Board is only acting in a manner consistent with 
international requests that emerged at the onset of Sarbanes-Oxley.  It is apparent, 
however, that the PCAOB has recognized the impact the Act has had on foreign relations 
and is doing its best to amend the strains that resulted from SOX. 
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CONCLUSION 
 This study has interpreted the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
difficulties entities face incorporating the Act’s requirements into their business practices.  
Part I focused on domestic and foreign registration with the PCAOB.  In Part II, a 
thorough examination of the history of U.S. securities legislation provided the foundation 
upon which it was possible to compare and contrast SOX with existing securities laws.  
PART III of the study explored the economic, legal and political impact of the Act in 
order to demonstrate the implications of it for U.S. foreign relations.  The final section 
explored alternative solutions to Sarbanes-Oxley and the development of SOX and the 
PCAOB to date.   
 Although the PCAOB has taken significant steps to rectify the impact of SOX 
abroad and its blow to U.S. foreign relations, the U.S. will need to continue to encourage 
foreign dialogue and promptly respond to international concerns over SOX.  If the U.S. 
does not respond to international concerns over SOX, foreign company membership on 
the U.S. market could continue to decline and the U.S. will isolate itself, suffering 
politically, economically, and socially.  While the future of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is not 
certain, it is certain that global accounting oversight will continue to play a role in future 
U.S. foreign relations and the U.S. will need to react to accounting oversight with greater 
care than it did its first time around. 
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